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11
the pseudohomosexual and latent homosexual may not fall within the traditional
categories and, hence, many suits grounded
upon such behavior must fail unless a new
ground for annulment is created, viz.,
homosexual activity per se. Homosexuality is regarded by many jurisdictions as an
infamous indignity to the marriage partner,
which makes the marriage so revolting that
it becomes impossible for the other party to
discharge the marital duties, and defeats
23
the entire purpose of the marital relation.
If New York is willing to accept the

23

See authorities cited note 11 supra. Much of

the sexual satisfaction of male and female homosexuals involves behavior that violates sodomy

and crime-against-nature statutes. PLOSCOWE, op.
cit. supra note 14, at 195-208.

College Education Held a
"Necessary" in Alimony Decree
Petitioner sought modification of a prior
support order to include payment for her
son's college education. The Family Court
of New York, in ordering the father to pay
an additional fifteen dollars a week during
the school year, held that a father's duty
to educate his children includes the providing of a college education if the child
exhibits "special aptitude" and the father
has the ability to pay. Weingast v. Weingast, 255 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Family Ct. 1964).
A father, whether or not he has custody
of his children, is required to provide them
with "necessaries." 1 While some degree
1 39 AM.

JUR.

Parent & Child § 41 (1942).
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proposition that homosexual activity is so
revolting as to defeat the whole purpose
of the marital relation, and is willing to
apply this rationale to suits for annulment,
then homosexual activity per se might be
considered a basis for annulling the marriage. This approach may be feasible in
view of New York's strict divorce laws
which do not provide any escape from the
marriage for a party suffering such indignities. However, if New York does recognize homosexual activity per se as a ground
for annulment on the theory that it defeats the purpose of the marital relation,
it will then have to deal with the additional
problems of defining and classifying those
types and degrees of homosexual activity
which do in fact make marriage unworkable.

of education was deemed a "necessary" at
common law 2 one of the earliest reported
cases in this country, Middlebury College
v. Chandler3 held that a college education
is not a "necessary." The court in that case
denied a student's claim that his father's
estate was liable for tuition in his stead, on
the ground that his father would have been
liable for his "necessaries."
Eighty years later, in the leading case
of Esteb v. Esteb 4 the Washington Supreme Court deemed a college education,
under the facts and circumstances involved,
a "necessary," and ordered a divorced
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 450 (American
ed. 1847).
3 16 Vt. 683, 42 Am. Dec. 537 (1844).
4 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926).
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father to pay his minor child's college expenses. In reaching its decision, the court
emphasized the special aptitude of the
child5 and the financial ability of the
father.6 In distinguishing Middlebury, the
court observed that "conditions have
changed greatly in almost a century ... 7
The Esteb case has been accepted by
many jurisdictions.s For example, in Jackman v. Short,9 the Oregon Supreme Court
ordered support for a college education.
However, the court did not require a "special aptitude" but instead emphasized the
"attitude, character, desire for learning and
10
well directed ambition" of the child.
In New York, it is uncertain whether
a college education should be deemed a
"necessary." In 1930, the appellate division refused to order college support for
a "child" over twenty-one." While reaffirming the position taken in Middlebury,
i.e., that college is not a "necessary," the
court did admit, however, that there might
be exceptions."
Recently the appellate division, although
not expressly overruling Halsted v. Hal5Id. at 175-76, 244 Pac. at 264-65.
6( d. at 185, 244 Pac. at 268.
7 Id. at 182, 244 Pac. at 267.
8See Ogle v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 483, 156 So. 2d
345 (1963); Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 32,
163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa
142, 30 N.W.2d 748 (1948); Titus v. Titus, 311
Mich. 434, 18 N.W.2d 883 (1945); Pass v. Pass,
238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 170 Ohio St. 507, 166 N.E.2d 396
(1960); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109
P.2d 860 (1941); Commonwealth v. Sommerville, 200 Pa. Super. 640, 190 A.2d 182 (1963);
Atchley v. Atchley, 29 Tenn. App. 124, 194
S.W.2d 252 (1945); Barris v. Craig, 202 Va. 229,
117 S.E.2d 63 (1960).
9 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941).
10 Id. at 656, 109 P.2d at 872.
11Halsted v. Halsted, 228 App. Div. 298, 239
N.Y. Supp. 422 (2d Dep't 1930).
12 Id.
at 299, 239 N.Y. Supp. at 424.

sted, has illustrated the falsity of the view
that college is never a "necessary," and
has indicated that the question is one
which is within the discretion of the trial
court. 3 One clear limitation which has
been placed upon this discretion is that
the financial ability of the father must be
considered. 4
In the absence of further clear guides
to their exercise of discretion, and in view
of the strong dictum in Halsted ostensibly
establishing a general rule that college is
not a "necessary," the lower courts have
been divided as to what facts and circumstances are required to sustain an award
for college support. 1"
In the instant case, the Family Court
stated that a father normally has no duty
to provide a college education for his children. However, the Court noted that it
possessed the power to order such support,
and expressed the view that children of
broken homes are entitled to special consideration.16
The Court indicated that the extent of
education to be considered a "necessary"
is a question of fact to be determined in
each individual case. Judge Golding, who
penned the Court's opinion in this case,
reasoned that, under the facts and circumstances involved herein, the father should
pay part of the cost of his son's college
"3See Matthews v. Matthews, 14 App. Div. 2d
546, 217 N.Y.S.2d 736 (2d Dep't 1960) (memorandum decision).
14See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 282 App. Div. 30,
121 N.Y.S.2d 818 (4th Dep't 1953) (per curiam).
1.See Grishaver v. Grishaver, 225 N.Y.S.2d 924
(Sup. Ct. 1961); O'Brien v. Springer, 202 Misc.
210, 107 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Cohen
v. Cohen, 193 Misc. 106, 82 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). Compare Herbert v.Herbert, 198 Misc.
515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950) with
Samson v. Schoen, 204 Misc. 603, 121 N.Y.S.2d
489 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953).
16 255 N.Y.S.2d 341,
344 (Family Ct. 1964).
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education. In accordance with this decision,
the father was ordered to pay approximately $540 per year out of a total cost to
the student of about $1,478.1'
As the basis of its decision, the Court
emphasized the child's special aptitude,
i.e., that he had scored in the top ten per
cent of those taking the College Board
examinations and had received a $400
work grant from the university.18 Great
reliance was also placed on the fact that
the father earned in excess of $12,000 a
year, and had stated that he was not opposed to his son attending college.1" Thus,
the Court indicated that the prime factors
to be considered were the financial ability
of the father and the "special aptitude" of
the child. This view is in accord with
precedent found in many other jurisdictions. 20
Almost all cases, in New York and in
other jurisdictions, which have allowed
support for a child in college, are in agreement that the financial ability of the father
is of primary importance. 21 In addition, the
instant case is in agreement with the Esteb
rule that the child should possess "special
aptitude." It does not appear, however,
that the latter requirement should be necessary. The better rule would seem to be the
one established by the Jackman case, where
the court looked to the desire and capability of the child, rather than to any "special
aptitude." The Esteb rule had its origin in
cases decided in a period when college education was a rare occurrence.2 2 Today a
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college education has become commonplace and the sine qua non for obtaining
better employment. For this reason, it appears that by ordering support for highly
qualified students (those in a good position
to obtain scholarships and loans) and refusing such support to children who are
capable of college work (although not exceptional), the courts are, in effect, protecting the strong and ignoring the weak.
An interesting problem, which the instant case leaves unanswered, is whether
or not the payments will cease when the
student attains his majority. It appears that
they will cease in the usual case. 23 The
family court has authority to order support for the child only until he attains the
age of twenty-one, absent "exceptional circumstances." 24 In addition to this limitation upon its subject matter jurisdiction,
the family court, by ordering college support for a student beyond the age of
twenty-one, would appear to be extending
the "exception" to such support referred to
by the appellate division in its Halsted
opinion. Nevertheless, the termination of
support could result in serious consequences for a student entering his junior or
senior year of college with no other financial resources.
This case also leaves unresolved the
question of what type of college education
a father is obliged to provide. There is substantial variation between the nominal fees
of most state universities and the high fees
of some private institutions. In the prin-

20 See cases cited note 8, supra.
21 Ibid. Herbert v. Herbert, supra note 15.

23 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 443(b). "An order of
support under this section may not run beyond
the child's minority. The court may, however, extend the duration of such an order beyond the
child's minority if the child suffers physical or
mental disabilities or if there are other exceptional

-2See Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt.
683, 42 Am. Dec. 537 (1844).

circumstances that warrant such extension."
24 Ibid.

11Id. at 343.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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cipal case, for example, the child was
boarding at a private university. The Court
did not directly discuss this problem, but
by its order suggested an apparent solution. The father was not ordered to pay the
entire cost of college for his son, but instead was ordered to pay part of the cost.
The amount of the father's required payments was based more on his ability to pay
than on the cost of the education selected
by the child. Such a solution, which bases
the amount of support for college on the
father's income, might be more practical
than attempting to lay down any definite

rules as to the type of college education to
be provided and appears to coincide with
2
the "station in life" doctrine of support. 5
The Weingast decision has raised many
questions and has left the law of New York
on this subject unsettled. However, the rule
adopted by the Family Court manifests the
trend which, similar to that in other jurisdictions, indicates a more liberal view with
respect to the necessity of a college education in today's highly complex and mechanized society.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
(Continued)

layman when he leaves that state is both
unrealistic and impractical in the present
setting. The limitations placed on the outof-state attorney should be minimal. He
should be free to engage in legal activities
outside his "home" state as long as those
who are affected by such activities are adequately protected.

complished by the particular state wherein
this practice occurs. However, the demands and needs of a modern society call
for a change in the present thinking on the
part of the states. To treat an attorney,
admitted to the bar of another state, as a

25

39 AM.

JUR.

Parent & Child § 48 (1942).

